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Abstract 
 
Empirical studies on the effects of fiscal adjustments apply different approaches to identify 
discretionary changes in fiscal policy. While the results of one strand of literature suggest that 
the effects of fiscal adjustments on GDP are small or even positive, particularly for spending 
cuts (expansionary austerity), this strand of literature is under criticism because of an 
incomplete cyclical adjustment strategy. I compare the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
adjustments using five different identification strategies for a panel of 30 OECD countries 
over the period 1980 to 2012 and show that the strategy chosen for identifying fiscal policy 
has a crucial impact on the estimated effects. My results suggest that large fiscal adjustments 
(both revenue and spending based) lead to economic contractions, after appropriate 
controlling for cyclical effects and one-off capital transfers. These findings indicate that a 
great deal of previous empirical research on fiscal adjustments and expansionary austerity is 
based on an incomplete measure of fiscal policy and needs to be reevaluated. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Empirical research on the effects of fiscal policy is less than conclusive when it comes to the 
macroeconomic consequences of fiscal adjustments. While the predominant share of the 
literature on fiscal policy states that fiscal contractions have negative effects on GDP (e. g. 
Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, Romer and Romer, 2010, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012), 
one strand of literature states that large fiscal adjustments are likely to be expansionary 
(expansionary austerity), and that spending-based corrections are less damaging for growth 
compared to fiscal adjustments that involve tax increases (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 
1997; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010, 2012). This literature analyses the impact of changes 
in cyclically-adjusted primary budget balances (CAPB) on GDP (data-based approach). 
Based on a narrative identification strategy, Leigh et al. (2010) and Guajardo et al. (2011) 
analyse cases of fiscal adjustments and find no support for expansionary austerity. Each of 
these points of view leads to alternative policy recommendations for solving the ongoing 
fiscal crisis in Europe and other OECD countries. 
In this paper I focus on the identification strategy of the data-based approach and analyse the 
macroeconomic consequences of fiscal policy in a panel of 30 OECD countries during the 
period 1980 to 2012. I compare five different (data-based) identification strategies and argue 
that the choice of strategy for how to adjust the data for cyclical effects influences the results. 
Without appropriate controlling for cyclical effects, large changes in primary budget balances 
(as a share of GDP) may be driven by cyclical fluctuations and, thus, by changes in the 
denominator of revenue or expenditure ratios. Since automatic stabilizers decrease 
government budget balances in economic recessions, the positive (automatic) relationship 
between (changes in) output gaps and (changes in) budget balances in connection with an 
incomplete cyclical adjustment would bias the results of data-based analyses toward 
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underestimating the (negative) Keynesian effects of fiscal policy on GDP, and toward 
suggesting a positive (non-Keynesian) relationship between changes in primary balances and 
short-run GDP growth (expansionary austerity).
1
 
Moreover, changes in (cyclically-adjusted) primary balances include one-off operations in 
capital transfers with no or only limited impact on economic activity that do not necessarily 
reflect discretionary changes in fiscal policy and are not designed to stimulate the economy or 
to adjust deficits in the long run (Joumard et al., 2008). Ignoring this, the data-based approach 
might identify large one-offs in capital transfers, rather than structural fiscal adjustments. 
To identify changes in fiscal policy, I propose to correct for cyclical fluctuations in budget 
data with estimations of trend or potential GDP, and to exclude one-off capital transfers from 
the analysis. I suggest either excluding government (net) capital transfers from the budget 
balance, or examining changes in underlying primary balances (CAPBU).
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I show that the choice of strategy for identifying changes in fiscal policy has a crucial impact 
on the results. While the results of conventional data-based approaches suggest that the 
effects of fiscal adjustments on GDP are small or even positive, particularly for spending cuts 
(expansionary austerity), my results reveal that large fiscal adjustments (both revenue and 
spending-based) lead to economic contractions, after controlling for cyclical effects and one-
off capital transfers. These findings indicate that a great deal of previous empirical research 
on expansionary austerity needs to be reevaluated, seeing how it is based on an incomplete 
measure of fiscal policy. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Perotti (2012) discusses the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem in Alesina and Perotti (1995). Note that 
under common assumptions about the elasticities of government revenue- and spending categories, particularly 
the share of government spending in terms of GDP exhibits a (counter-) cyclical behavior. 
2
 According to Joumard et al. (2008), the underlying balance is the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, after 
exclusion of one-off operations in capital transfers. Heylen et al. (2013) analyse underlying primary balances to 
avoid biases that may be induced by one-off budgetary measures. They do not, however, analyse the 
macroeconomic effects of changes in underlying balances. 
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2. Data-Based Approach  
 
One standard approach to estimate the effect of fiscal policy on GDP is to regress real GDP 
growth itY  on lagged GDP growth, a measure of fiscal policy ( itFP ), and a vector of 
controls itX  (Guajardo et al., 2011): 
 
iitit
j
jitjit XFPYY   


2
1
0     (1) 
 
where i and t index countries and years. One strand of the literature, the data-based approach, 
identifies discretionary changes in fiscal policy itFP  with changes in cyclically-adjusted 
government primary balances (CAPB).
3
 The data-based approach finds evidence in support of 
the expansionary austerity hypothesis that fiscal contractions do not necessarily reduce 
growth, not even in the short run (Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997; Alesina and Ardagna, 
1998, 2010, 2012). Because of the frequent application of data-based analyses, this approach 
is referred to as the conventional approach (according to Guajardo et al., 2011). 
Leigh et al. (2010) and Guajardo et al. (2011) criticize this method and contrast the data-
based approach with a narrative analysis of historical fiscal contractions (historical 
approach).
4
 According to this second strand of the literature, large fiscal adjustments are 
likely to cause recessions (Devries et al., 2011). Recent studies cast additional doubt on the 
expansionary austerity hypothesis and argue that the conventional approach is likely to 
underestimate the effects of fiscal consolidation on economic activity.
5
 It is even conceivable 
that fiscal multipliers are substantially larger than assumed by recent forecasts and policy 
                                                 
3
 De Castro et al. (2010) suggest analyzing changes in CAPB if interest lies in government action. See Heller et 
al. (1986), Blanchard (1990), and Alesina and Perotti (1995) for a review of fiscal impulse measures.  
4
 See Romer and Romer (2010) on the narrative identification strategy and an analysis of exogenous changes in 
tax policy in the United States.  
5
 See Romer (2011) for a critical discussion of the results presented in Alesina and Ardagna (2011), and 
Guajardo et al. (2011) for a criticism of data-based analyses.  
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simulations (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). It is thus questionable whether the conventional 
approach is a viable means of identifying discretionary changes in fiscal policy and whether 
the expansionary austerity hypothesis is sustainable.
 
For example, Perotti (2012) shows that 
the conventional approach may be inappropriate if it does not take into account systematic 
counter-cyclical responses of fiscal policy. Based on Perotti (2012), the response of the 
budget balance to economic conditions can be formalized as 
 
ttatct GapGapPB       (2) 
 
where PB  denotes changes in the primary surplus and Gap  represents annual changes in 
the output gap. The automatic (counter-) cyclical influence of economic cycles on the 
(primary) budget balance is expressed with c , while a  captures systematic counter-cyclical 
policy responses to economic conditions (beyond automatic stabilization). According to 
Perotti (2012), one would assume c  and a  > 0 if automatic stabilizers and policy activism 
behave counter-cyclically. Changes in the primary surplus would reveal a cyclical pattern 
even after controlling perfectly for the effects of automatic stabilization. Perotti (2012) 
highlights two problems with the conventional approach based on CAPB: firstly, the problem 
of “imperfect cyclical adjustment” and, secondly, the “countercyclical response” problem.6 
According to Equation (3), only under the assumption that c  perfectly captures the effects of 
automatic responses to economic cycles, and if fiscal policy is not counter-cyclical ( a = 0), 
will CAPB not include a cyclical pattern.
7
 
 
ttatctt GapGapPBCAPB      (3) 
                                                 
6
 See Section 3 on the issue of cyclical adjustment of budget data and potential pitfalls. 
7
 See Lane (2003) on the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy in OECD countries.  
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Even if a  = 0, and if c  perfectly captures automatic stabilizers, however, CAPB contain all 
expenditures (and revenues) that are not interest expenditures (and revenues). Large changes 
in cyclically-adjusted primary balances may be one-off expenditures in capital transfers that, 
for instance, reflect revenues from privatization or losses from nationalization operations.
8
 
 
ttta eOGapCAPB       (4) 
 
One-off operations, tO , thus may influence itCAPB  but have no or only limited effect on 
economic activity (Joumard et al., 2008), even if we assume a  = 0. The conventional 
approach provides unbiased estimations of the effects of fiscal policy under the following 
three assumptions: 
 
a) The CAPS do not include a cyclical pattern ( c  would perfectly capture the effects of 
automatic responses to economic environments), 
b) Fiscal policy is not pro- or counter-cyclical ( a = 0), 
c) The fiscal data do not include one-offs in capital transfers ( tO = 0). 
 
Based on this, it is conceivable that the conventional approach systematically underestimates 
the effects of fiscal policy because of imperfect cyclical adjustment and counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy (Perotti, 2012). The incomplete definition of fiscal policy in data-based approaches 
may have led to the different results found by the data-based and historical approaches. 
                                                 
8
 I discuss the problem of one-offs in capital transfers in more detail in Section 4. 
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Under the assumption that a) and b) hold on average and for cases of fiscal adjustments, 
however, results of the conventional analysis would be unbiased if we exclude one-off 
operations ( tO  = 0). 
 
3. Cyclical Adjustment 
 
Automatic stabilizers decrease government budget balances in economic recessions. Because 
of this positive (automatic) relationship between (changes in) output gaps and (changes in) 
budget balances, an incomplete cyclical adjustment will bias the results of data-based 
analyses toward underestimating the (negative) Keynesian effects of fiscal policy on GDP, 
and towards suggesting a positive (non-Keynesian) relationship between changes in primary 
balances and GDP growth (expansionary austerity). For this reason, a great deal of the 
literature on fiscal policy focuses on how to adjust for cyclical effects. There are many ways 
to adjust budget balances for the effects of automatic stabilizers.
9
 Budgetary items respond in 
various ways to cyclical fluctuations and it is almost impossible to account for every cyclical 
side effect. I distinguish between four different strategies for dealing with the issue of 
automatic stabilization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 See Blanchard (1990), Alesina and Perotti (1995), Girouard and André (2005), and Fedelino et al. (2009) for a 
detailed discussion of cyclical adjustment procedures. 
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a) No Cyclical Adjustment 
 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) discuss using non-adjusted primary budget balances (PB) as a 
share of GDP as an indicator of fiscal policy and highlight its simplicity.
10
 According to 
Alesina and Perotti (1995), even although it ignores cyclical fluctuations, “this measure is not 
a bad approximation as long as expenditures and revenues are close to being unit elastic to 
GDP.”11 In contrast, Perotti (2012) highlights the need to correct for cyclical effects and notes 
that an incomplete cyclical adjustment would bias the results “again to a less powerful effect 
of fiscal policy.” I use the non-adjusted measure of fiscal policy to verify Alesina and 
Ardagna’s (2010) statement that “the details of how to adjust for the cycle do not matter much 
for the qualitative nature of the results” and that “in fact, even not correcting at all would give 
similar results,” although a large body of the literature recommends analysing cyclically-
adjusted changes in primary balances as a share of GDP (if one does not assume government 
revenues and expenditures to be unit elastic). 
 
b) The “Alesina Measure” 
 
Blanchard (1990) discusses the necessity of adjusting for cyclical effects and suggests an 
“indicator of discretionary change”: “the value of the primary surplus which would have 
prevailed, were unemployment at the same value as in the previous year, minus the value of 
the primary surplus in the previous year, both in ratio to GNP in each year.” 
The literature on expansionary austerity frequently refers to this proposal (e.g., Alesina and 
Perotti, 1995, 1997; Ardagna, 2004; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010, 2012) because it 
                                                 
10
 The primary deficit is the government budget deficit net of interest expenditure. There is a broad consensus in 
the literature to exclude interest expenditure. See Blanchard (1990) and Perotti (2012) on the need to control for 
changes in inflation and real interest expenditure. 
11
 According to a comprehensive literature on the effects of automatic stabilizers, this does not seem to be the 
case for government expenditure (e.g., Girouard and André, 2005). 
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avoids complicated estimations of output gaps with production functions or filter methods.
12
 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010) compute the measure in two 
steps: first with regressions of social transfers as a share of GDP (TRANS) on a time trend
13
 
and on the unemployment rate: 
 
ttt UTRENDTRANSF   210     (5) 
 
Based on the estimations of Equation (5), Alesina and Perotti (1995) estimate the ratio of 
social transfers per GDP that would have prevailed if the unemployment rate remains the 
same as the previous year:
14
 
 
tttt UTRENDUTRANSF  ˆˆˆˆ)( 12101      (6) 
 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) use the same procedure to adjust current government revenues as a 
ratio of GDP; however, they do not adjust government expenditure other than social transfers 
(as a share of GDP).
15
 
Together with other (unadjusted) components of the government balance, Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) compute the primary balance that would have prevailed if unemployment stays at the 
                                                 
12
 Alesina and Ardagna (2010) note that “We prefer this method to more complicated measures like those 
produced by the OECD because the latter are a bit of a black box based on many assumptions about the fiscal 
multipliers on which there is much uncertainty.” 
13
 Alesina and Perotti (1995) apply two time trends (one for the pre-1975 period and one for the post-1975 
period); Alesina and Ardagna (2010) apply only one time trend. In the empirical part of this paper, I use data for 
the period 1980 to 2012 so that one time trend should be sufficient. 
14
 Based on Equation (5), I present the estimated unemployment-related elasticities ( 2 ) for every country and 
budget item in the Appendix. Data for Estonia, Israel, and Luxembourg are not available for all variables, so I 
exclude these countries from the analysis based on AFI and BFI. 
15
 According to Alesina and Perotti (1995), revenues are comprised of direct taxes, indirect taxes, and social 
security contributions. In the empirical part of this paper, I use current revenues, which—according to the OECD 
definitions—additionally includes property income received by the government and other current receipts. The 
definition of transfers used by Alesina and Perotti (1995) includes social security benefits, social assistance 
grants, unfunded employee pension and welfare benefits, transfers to the rest of the world, transfers to private 
nonprofit institutions serving households, and net casualty insurance premiums, as well as other transfers, while I 
take into account social security benefits paid by the general government, as a share of GDP, which I believe to 
be consistent with the definitions in Alesina and Ardagna (2010). 
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previous year’s level. Accordingly, the fiscal impulse is computed as the difference between 
the unemployment-adjusted primary balance and the previous year’s primary balance. In the 
following, I refer to this measure, used in Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) and Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998, 2010, 2012), as the Alesina measure of fiscal impulse (AFI). Again, under the 
assumption that government expenditures other than social transfers are unit elastic, it would 
be conceivable not to adjust government consumption as a share of GDP for cyclical effects 
(as the Alesina measure does). Under the widely accepted consensus in the literature on 
cyclical adjustment of fiscal data, however, it seems more reasonable to assume that 
government expenditures are not unit elastic or that the elasticity is close to zero. If, however, 
government revenues are unit elastic, it would be more meaningful to adjust expenditures 
(other than transfers), rather than revenues. To ignore the adjustment of government 
expenditures as a share of GDP creates an incomplete cyclical adjustment problem that, 
according to the assumptions made above, biases the results toward a positive relationship 
between changes in primary balances and GDP growth.
16
 
 
c) The “Blanchard Measure” 
 
To solve the problem of incomplete cyclical adjustment, I compute cyclically-adjusted budget 
figures using the method suggested by Blanchard (1990) based on Equations (5) and (6), but 
correct current revenues, as well as current primary expenditures (not only transfers), as a 
share of GDP for cyclical effects. Following Alesina and Perotti (1995), I refer to this 
measure as the Blanchard measure of fiscal impulse (BFI). The cyclical adjustment of 
revenues is similar to that under the Alesina measure, but the adjustment of primary 
expenditures as a share of GDP additionally takes into account primary current expenditures 
                                                 
16
 More precisely, decreasing government expenditure (other than transfers), e.g., government consumption (per 
GDP), may turn out to be associated with increasing GDP growth. Studies that apply the Alesina measure find 
that decreases in government consumption are associated with increasing growth (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 
1997; Ardagna, 2004; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010). 
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other than social transfers.
17
 Typhon Kollintzas (1995) criticizes the procedure used to 
compute the BFI in Alesina and Perotti (1995) and provides a number of reasons why “the 
BFI could be a poor measure of discretionary fiscal policy changes.” Since AFI and BFI 
express (changes in) fiscal policy in terms of GDP ratios, it is necessary to assume a perfect 
co-movement of GDP and unemployment to exclude cyclical effects in expenditure ratios, 
particularly if we assume an elasticity of expenditure close to zero.
18
 Kollintzas (1995) 
suggests applying Hodrick-Prescott filtered series, adjusted for cyclical effects. It is thus 
questionable whether it is possible to identify the cyclical effects of taxes and spending with 
the Blanchard measure, so that studies based on the BFI may be prone to an incomplete 
cyclical adjustment problem.
19
 
 
d) The “OECD Measure” 
 
To measure cyclically-adjusted fiscal positions, the OECD provides a measure, different from 
the one suggested by Blanchard (1990), based on the output gap in connection with GDP 
elasticities of government revenue and spending categories (Girouard and André, 2005). 
According to the OECD, the aggregated spending elasticity is close to zero, whereas the 
revenue elasticity is close to one (Fedelino et al., 2009), because at the expenditure side only 
unemployment benefits (which represent a small share of total expenditures) respond to 
cyclical fluctuations, while other expenditure categories are assumed to be inelastic. With the 
estimated elasticities and estimations of the output gap, cyclically-adjusted budget data are 
computed. The adjusted series is subsequently expressed in relation to potential GDP. The 
OECD provides cyclically-adjusted data based on this approach.  
                                                 
17
 According to the OECD definition, primary current expenditures include government final consumption, 
social security benefits, and other current outlays of the general government. 
18
 “Another reason for being concerned with the BFI is that the unemployment rate is typically lagging behind 
GDP. It means that the intended removal of all contemporaneous business cycle-induced fiscal policy changes 
may be incomplete” (Kollintzas, 1995).  
19
 The same criticism is true for the Alesina measure. 
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4. One-Off Operations 
 
Large changes in cyclically-adjusted budget data may include one-offs in capital transfers that 
have no or limited effects on demand. Bornhorst et al. (2011) suggest adjusting government 
balances beyond the business cycle when analysing discretionary changes in fiscal policy. 
Joumard et al. (2008) propose a new fiscal indicator, the “underlying balances,” that identifies 
and excludes large one-off operations in capital transfers. Most of the one-off operations are 
classified as expenditures (capital transfers paid and other capital payments). Only a few 
countries (among them France, Italy, Greece, and Ireland) are affected by large one-off 
operations on the revenue side. It is conceivable that the presence of one-off operations, 
particularly on the expenditure side, distort the results toward finding no impact of fiscal 
stimuli and adjustments.
20
 Structural changes in fiscal policy are not predominantly driven by 
one-off operations in capital transfers. Fiscal adjustments focus on permanently reducing 
deficits, not just in one year through, for example, privatization operations. Alesina and 
Ardagna (2012) discuss the pitfalls of the “on-off adjustments” found in Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010), but do not exclude one-offs from the analysis.
21
 For the purpose of fiscal policy 
analysis, it is more reasonable to identify changes in the underlying balance. Since net capital 
transfers are low and of low volatility (after excluding one-offs), it is even conceivable to 
exclude (net) capital transfers from the government budget to obtain a more reliable measure 
of discretionary fiscal policy, and one that is easy to compute. To exclude one-offs in capital 
transfers, in the empirical part of this paper I rely on the underlying balances, as suggested by 
Jourmard et al. (2008).  
                                                 
20
 The data in the Appendix suggest that approximately one-third of the fiscal adjustments, as identified by large 
changes in CAPB, cannot be identified with large changes in CAPBU, and thus reflect one-offs in capital 
transfers. 
21
 Alesina and Ardagna (2012), for example, identify the period between 1996 and 2000 in Germany as one of 
the largest episodes of fiscal adjustment in OECD history; however, the multi-year increase in CAPB between 
1996 and 2000 in Germany is predominantly driven by the one-offs in 1995 and 2000. The change in the 
German general government underlying balance during the period 1995 and 2000 is low. 
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5. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
To estimate the effect of discretionary changes in fiscal policy on GDP, I regress real GDP 
growth itY  on lagged GDP growth, a measure of fiscal policy itPB , and a vector of 
controls itX : 
 
ittiitit
j
jitjit XPBYY   


2
1
   (7) 
 
 
where i and t index countries and years. I include country -and time-fixed effects to control 
for specific factors in a certain year or country. In the baseline-specification itPB  represents 
changes in (cyclically-adjusted or underlying) primary balances, depending on the 
identification approach. Based on the different treatment of cyclical adjustment (Section 3) 
and one-off expenditures, I compare five different strategies for identifying fiscal policy: 
 
Strategy 1: 
Changes in the primary balance (no adjustment), as a percentage of GDP (PB), 
 
Strategy 2: 
Changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, as a percentage of GDP, using the 
Alesina measure of fiscal impulse (AFI), 
 
Strategy 3: 
Changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, as a percentage of GDP, using the 
Blanchard measure of fiscal impulse (BFI), 
14 
 
 
Strategy 4: 
Changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, as a percentage of potential GDP, 
using the OECD measure (CAPB), and 
 
Strategy 5: 
Changes in the underlying primary balance, as a percentage of potential GDP (CAPBU). 
 
To distinguish between revenue- and spending-based adjustments, I separately include 
changes in (current) spending ( itPE ), changes in (current) revenues ( itPR ), and changes in 
capital outlays ( itCO )
22
, according to the respective identification strategy. To explore 
whether changes in current spending have a different effect on GDP compared to other 
changes in the primary balance, a third specification includes the measure of discretionary 
changes in fiscal policy (according to Strategy 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5) and the share of the fiscal 
adjustment that is based on cuts in current primary expenditures, 
it
it
PB
PE


. 
I obtain fiscal data for a panel of 30 OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2012 from the 
OECD Economic Outlook (No. 93) Database. The OECD provides cyclically-adjusted 
balances, as well as underlying balances, only starting in 1981. The AFI and BFI measures are 
computed as outlined in Section 3. For some countries, the OECD provides data only after 
1981, which is why the panel is unbalanced. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. 
To identify periods of large fiscal adjustments, I rely on the definition of Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and define a period of fiscal adjustment as a year in 
                                                 
22
 In accordance with the OECD definitions, net capital outlays as changes in primary balances minus changes in 
current revenues plus changes in primary current expenditure. 
15 
 
which the measure of fiscal policy improves by at least 1.5 percent of GDP. Again, I 
distinguish between five different definitions: 
 
Definition 1: 
A (more than) 1.5 percentage point increase in the primary balance, as a percentage of 
GDP (PB), 
 
Definition 2: 
A (more than) 1.5 percentage point increase in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, as 
a percentage of GDP, using the Alesina measure of fiscal impulse (AFI), 
 
Definition 3: 
A (more than) 1.5 percentage point increase in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, as 
a percentage of GDP, using the Blanchard measure of fiscal impulse (BFI), 
 
Definition 4: 
A (more than) 1.5 percentage point increase in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, as 
a percentage of potential GDP, using the OECD measure (CAPB), and 
 
Definition 5: 
A (more than) 1.5 percentage point increase in the underlying primary balance, as a 
percentage of potential GDP (CAPBU). 
 
I show all periods of fiscal adjustments based on these five definitions in the Appendix. 
According to definition 1, there are 139 cases of fiscal adjustment. The number of cases 
decreases to 128 (definition 2), 125 (definition 3) and 96 (definition 4). A more restrictive 
16 
 
approach to control for cyclical effects reduces the number of observations, indicating how to 
best adjust for cyclical effects matters, even for the identification of large cases of fiscal 
adjustments. The number of cases as identified by definition 5 decreases again substantially, 
from 84 to 58. The difference between Definitions 4 and 5 is the exclusion of one-offs. A 
large share of periods identified by CAPS thus reflect large one-offs in capital transfers with 
no or limited impact on economic demand (GDP). 
 
6. Results 
 
Table 2 shows the estimated impact of discretionary changes in fiscal policy on GDP, using 
the full information for 30 OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2012, and without 
restricting the sample size to particular periods of fiscal consolidation. 
The number of the column indicates the identification strategy, as outlined in Section 5 
(Strategies 1 to 5). The table shows that positive changes in primary balances (fiscal 
adjustments) are associated with increasing GDP growth in the same year, without taking into 
account the problem of cyclical adjustment, suggesting evidence for the expansionary 
austerity view. The effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the primary balance is associated 
with a 0.12 percent increase in real GDP (Column 1). Using cyclically-adjusted data, 
however, changes the results. The Alesina measure of fiscal impulse still shows a positive 
correlation with annual GDP growth, but it is insignificant (Column 2) and the positive effect 
is even less pronounced for the Blanchard measure (Column 3). 
The relationship between the OECD measure and annual GDP growth is negative, but 
statistically not significant. After excluding one-offs in capital transfers, the results indicate a 
large negative impact of changes in underlying balances on GDP growth in the short run. 
According to the analysis in Sections 3 and 4, the results in Columns 1 to 3 may suffer from 
17 
 
incomplete cyclical adjustments. While the measure of fiscal impulse in Column 4 includes 
one-offs, Column 5 shows that the negative effect of fiscal adjustments on GDP is particularly 
pronounced after excluding one-offs in capital transfers. One-offs in capital transfers thus 
distort the findings in previous analyses that do not control for capital transfers, at least if the 
object of interest is not the macroeconomic effects of one-offs in capital transfers, but the 
effect of adjustments in current revenues or current primary spending. 
Another key finding in the literature on expansionary austerity involves the composition of 
changes in fiscal policy (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010, 2012). 
Table 3 shows the estimated effect of a 1 percentage point increase in three different 
components of the primary balance (current revenues, current primary expenditures, and net 
capital outlays, respectively). Column 1 shows that both increases in revenues and increases 
in expenditures negatively correlate with GDP. Thus, a reduction in (current) expenditures 
should be associated with increasing GDP (expansionary austerity). This interpretation, 
however, ignores the issue of cyclical adjustment. 
Columns 2 and 3 show the results for the AFI and BFI, respectively. While the estimated 
impact of revenue-based adjustments remains unchanged, the estimated coefficient for 
increases in current primary spending decreases (from -0.6 to -0.2), but is statistically 
significant in Columns 1, 2, and 3. The results are very much in line with the evidence 
presented in previous studies (e.g. Alesina and Ardagana, 2010). However, it is possible that 
these results are to some extent reflecting a problem of imperfect cyclical adjustment 
(Kollintzas, 1995). 
Using the OECD measure, the impact of increasing (current) spending on annual GDP growth 
is the opposite (Column 4 of Table 3). That is, contrary to previous findings, current spending 
now has a positive effect on GDP. This indicates that the first results (Columns 1, 2, and 3) 
suffer from incomplete cyclical adjustment, which biases the coefficient towards non-
Keynesian effects. If cyclical unemployment and cyclical GDP are not perfectly correlated, 
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the BFI fails to control for cyclical effects in budgetary positions (as shares of GDP), which 
turns out to be particularly pronounced for current expenditures (because they are assumed to 
be inelastic, so that the ratio of expenditures as a share of GDP exhibits large fluctuations, 
while the ratio of taxes (as a share of GDP) does not, if the elasticity is approximately one). 
The results remain robust after excluding one-offs in capital transfers (Column 6 of table 3). 
The effect of increasing primary expenditures becomes even more pronounced and 
statistically significant. This result contrasts with previous findings based on other definitions 
of discretionary changes in fiscal policy (Columns 1 to 3). The exclusion of one-offs in capital 
transfers, however, does not change the insignificant effects of changes in (net) capital outlays 
on GDP. It is, thus, conceivable that changes in (net) capital transfers do not have a strong 
impact on economic activity in the short run compared to current spending. The essential 
finding in Table 3 is that the positive correlation of increases in government spending with 
GDP changes into a negative one, after controlling for cyclical effects and the influence of 
one-offs in capital transfers. According to Columns 5 and 6, the effect of decreases in 
(cyclically-adjusted or underlying) current primary spending on GDP is not less pronounced 
than the effect of tax cuts. This result indicates that the composition of fiscal adjustment is 
unimportant for the effects on GDP. Specifically, the effects of spending-side adjustments are 
not less contractive than tax cuts. 
 
7. Cases of Fiscal Adjustments 
 
I compare the macroeconomic effects of large cases of fiscal adjustment based on five 
different definitions of fiscal adjustment (Definitions 1 to 5). Following Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010), I exclude country- and time-fixed effects from the analysis of particular episodes of 
fiscal consolidations. 
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a) Definition 1 
 
The results in Table 4 are based on non-adjusted fiscal data (Definition 1). According to 
Perotti (2012), the problem of “imperfect cyclical adjustment” would bias the results towards 
an underestimation of the effects of fiscal policy on GDP. The effect of an improvement in the 
primary balance on GDP is negative, but statistically not significant at conventional levels 
(Column 1). Taking into account that the PB includes counter-cyclical feedback of automatic 
stabilizers, it is conceivable that the coefficient could be biased toward showing a positive 
correlation (imperfect cyclical adjustment), reflecting the positive response (of budget 
balances to GDP). A look at the results in Column 2 suggests that both spending cuts and tax 
cuts might have a positive influence on GDP. That is, spending cuts would increase GDP, 
even in the short run, providing support for the expansionary austerity hypothesis. However, 
this result may also be flawed due to the problem of imperfect cyclical adjustment. If GDP is 
low, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio increases, showing a negative relationship between 
expenditures and GDP, without adjusting for cyclical fluctuations. 
Column 3 of Table 4 suggests that fiscal adjustments are less damaging for GDP if they 
involve mainly (current primary) expenditure cuts. The results based on Definition 1 suggest 
that the composition of budget cuts does matter. This is a finding very much in accordance 
with the results of the literature on expansionary austerity, but probably biased because the 
effects of automatic stabilization have been ignored. 
 
b) Definition 2 
 
Table 5 shows the results when fiscal adjustments are measured according to Definition 2. 
The fiscal data are cyclically adjusted, based on the Alesina method. The cases identified by 
this method do not differ substantially from those found under Definition 1 (see the 
20 
 
Appendix). Under Definition 2, increasing primary balances have a significant negative 
influence on GDP, suggesting that large fiscal adjustments tend to decrease growth (Column 1 
of Table 5). This effect, however, is mainly based on the contractive effect of increases in 
current revenues, rather than on current primary expenditures, while (net) capital outlays have 
a positive influence on GDP (Column 2). Despite the fact that the expansionary effect of 
spending cuts is not significant, column 3 indicates that the composition of fiscal adjustments 
influences the macroeconomic effects, so that spending-based adjustments seem to be less 
harmful for growth.
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c) Definition 3  
 
Table 6 replicates the analysis, this time with fiscal adjustments measured according to 
Definition 3. The fiscal data are cyclically adjusted based on the Blanchard measure. The 
results are very similar to the results based on the Alesina measure. Specifically, while the 
effect of increases in primary balances is negative (Column 1), this effect is particularly 
pronounced for increases in revenues, while the adjustment of expenditures does not seem to 
influence GDP (Column 2). If adjustments are predominantly based on current spending, the 
effect on GDP might be less contractive, but the coefficient is not significant at conventional 
levels (Column 3). However, it is possible that both measures, the AFI and the BFI, fail to 
control for cyclical effects in primary balances (per GDP), as discussed in chapter three. 
 
d) Definition 4 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the analysis based on Definition 4. The fiscal data are cyclically 
adjusted according to the OECD method. According to this definition, both spending and tax-
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 As stated in Alesina, the difference between results based on non-adjusted series and the AFI is low. It is, 
however, reasonable to assume that the way cyclical effects have been adjusted for influences the results. 
21 
 
based adjustments significantly reduce GDP. Column 1 indicates that large fiscal adjustments 
reduce growth; the result is significant at the 1 percent level. Column 2 suggests that an 
increase in primary expenditures, as well as in (net) capital outlays, increases growth, whereas 
increases in current revenues decrease growth. The findings are very pronounced and 
statistically significant. Column 3 shows that fiscal adjustments based on current (primary) 
expenditures more heavily affect growth compared to other contractive measures. This 
finding indicates that the composition of fiscal adjustments matters, but the sign of the 
coefficient is different from that of the previous analysis, and statistically significant. 
Contrary to previous findings, it is conceivable that fiscal adjustments that mainly involve 
current primary expenditures are particularly harmful for growth in the short run, according to 
the OECD measure. 
 
e) Definition 5 
 
Table 8 shows the results, based on Definition 3, after excluding one-offs in capital transfers. 
The estimated effect of fiscal adjustments on GDP is negative (Column 1). A one percentage 
point increase in fiscal adjustments would decrease GDP in the same year by 0.55 percentage 
points. The finding is significant at conventional levels, and in accord with previous work 
employing narrative methods. Column 2 shows that both tax increases and spending cuts are 
likely to have a significant positive effect on GDP, while the coefficient of (net) capital 
outlays is insignificant. Column 3 shows that the composition of fiscal adjustments is not 
likely to affect growth; the coefficient is positive, but statistically not significant. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy applies different ways 
of identifying discretionary changes in fiscal policy. The data-based or conventional 
approach examines changes in cyclically-adjusted budget balances and finds evidence for 
expansionary austerity; the historical approach uses historical information to identify 
discretionary changes in fiscal policy and finds that fiscal adjustments are contractive. I 
criticise the identification strategy as applied by a large body of the data-based literature 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995 and 1996 and Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010, 2012). Firstly, the 
cyclically adjustment procedure applied by Alesina and Perotti (1995) fails to control for 
cyclical effects, particularly in government expenditures. Secondly, the presence of one-offs 
in capital transfers biases the estimated effects of data-based analyses again towards non-
Keynesian results. 
I compare the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy based on five different strategies for 
identifying fiscal policy changes. The five strategies are: (1) changes in (non-adjusted) 
primary budget balances (PB); (2) cyclically-adjusted balances (AFI), as suggested by Alesina 
and Perotti (1995); (3) cyclically-adjusted balances (BFI), as suggested by Blanchard (1990); 
(4) cyclically-adjusted primary balances, as computed by the OECD (CAPB); and (5) 
underlying primary balances (CAPBU), which excludes one-offs in capital transfers and 
which is, as I argue, a better measure of fiscal stance. 
The estimations show that the way of adjusting for cyclical effects influences the results. 
While the results based on non-adjusted data, the AFI and BFI, suggest that expenditure-based 
consolidations are not contractive, and may even be expansionary, the results based on CAPB 
and UPB indicate that both revenue- and spending-based adjustments are associated with 
recessions. 
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My interpretation of these findings is that estimations based on changes in non-adjusted data 
(PB), the Alesina measure or the Blanchard measure, are prone to an incomplete cyclical 
adjustment problem. According to Perotti (2012), an incomplete cyclical adjustment can bias 
the results toward non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. The cyclical adjustment of PB, as 
well as the AFI, is particularly incomplete because it does not exclude cyclical fluctuations in 
government spending (as a ratio of GDP). Moreover, according to Kollintzas (1995), the AFI 
and BFI are ineffective at adjusting the ratios of government revenues and expenditures if the 
cyclical component of unemployment and GDP is not perfectly contemporarily correlated. 
The lagged (and varying) relationship between GDP and unemployment suggests that this 
criticism holds for both unemployment-adjusted measures of fiscal policy (AFI and BFI). 
Consequently, if in a recession GDP decreases, but unemployment does not increase 
immediately, the ratio of expenditures per GDP will increase; however, AFI and BFI do not 
assign this to cyclical effects, but to a discretionary increase in the expenditure ratio. In this 
regard, the positive association of AFI or BFI with increasing expenditure ratios is a result of 
an incomplete cyclical adjustment, reflecting an increase of the denominator in expenditure 
ratios. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that the exclusion of one-offs affects the results. Without 
controlling for one-offs in capital transfers, the results do not necessarily indicate that fiscal 
adjustments are contractive, while the results based on the underlying balance show that 
increases in primary balances (on average) negatively influence GDP (Table 2). Results based 
on the CAPB thus may underestimate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, if, that is, 
the object of interest is not the effects of one-offs in capital transfers, but changes in current 
revenues or spending. 
I propose using cyclically-adjusted measures, based on the OECD approach, and excluding 
one-off capital transfers in data-based / conventional analyses of fiscal policy. Using 
underlying balances, I show that the results of the data-based approach are in line with the 
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results of the narrative approach. Based on this strategy of identifying changes in fiscal 
policy, large fiscal adjustments (at the revenue- and spending-side) have sizeable contractive 
effects on GDP.  
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      GDP growth 890 2.59 2.91 -14.21 12.27 
GDP growth OECD 990 2.44 1.55 -3.60 4.84 
Government debt 732 65.06 32.86 7.31 219.12 
 PB 815 -0.02 2.35 -19.27 17.61 
R 765 0.09 1.05 -3.91 4.50 
E 760 0.20 1.36 -4.94 8.32 
CO 743 -0.10 1.68 -16.76 17.21 
CAPB (AFI) 738 0.02 2.34 -17.78 17.85 
CAR (AFI) 760 0.09 1.03 -3.54 3.97 
CAE (AFI) 750 0.17 1.20 -5.24 5.71 
CACO (AFI) 738 -0.09 1.66 -16.76 17.21 
CAPB (BFI) 738 0.04 2.28 -18.04 18.06 
CAR (BFI) 760 0.09 1.03 -3.54 3.97 
CAE (BFI) 750 0.15 1.17 -5.56 4.93 
CACO (BFI) 738 -0.09 1.66 -16.76 17.21 
CAPB (OECD) 687 -0.06 2.11 -19.93 16.41 
CAR (OECD) 690 -0.02 1.16 -5.63 6.19 
CAE (OECD) 714 0.14 1.02 -5.15 4.65 
CACO (OECD) 684 -0.11 1.66 -15.45 15.75 
CAPBU 677 -0.06 1.42 -5.97 6.40 
CARU 683 -0.03 1.16 -5.65 6.13 
CAEU 711 0.10 1.16 -5.78 4.83 
CACOU 677 -0.06 0.35 -3.42 1.47 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, own calculation. 
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Table 2 
 
GDP Growth and Different Measures of Fiscal Policy 
 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
      
      
GDP growth (-1) 0.478*** 0.492*** 0.495*** 0.529*** 0.533*** 
 (0.040) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.043) 
GDP growth (-2) -0.123 -0.047 -0.046 -0.121 -0.139 
 (0.078) (0.054) (0.054) (0.085) (0.086) 
OECD growth (-1) -0.228*** -0.224*** -0.222*** -0.214** -0.170** 
 (0.067) (0.070) (0.070) (0.082) (0.068) 
Debt (-1) -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 PB 0.122***     
 (0.039)     
CAPB, AAP  0.066    
  (0.044)    
CAPB, BFI   0.042   
   (0.038)   
CAPB, OECD    -0.061  
    (0.058)  
CAPBU     -0.268*** 
     (0.093) 
      
Observations 669 639 639 616 607 
R-squared 0.640 0.647 0.645 0.662 0.675 
Countries 29 27 27 30 30 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable: Real GDP growth. Explanatory variables are changes of fiscal variables (PB, AFI, 
BFI, CAPB, CAPBU), lagged GDP growth, lagged GDP growth in OECD countries, and lagged government 
debt (as a percentage of GDP). All regressions include cross-section and period-fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
 
GDP Growth and Revenue- vs. Spending-Based Fiscal Policy 
 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
      
GDP growth (-1) 0.402*** 0.500*** 0.520*** 0.540*** 0.532*** 
 (0.057) (0.049) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) 
GDP growth (-2) 0.002 -0.007 -0.017 -0.132 -0.141 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.081) (0.085) 
OECD growth (-1) -0.125** -0.185*** -0.201*** -0.231** -0.139** 
 (0.061) (0.065) (0.067) (0.085) (0.062) 
Debt (-1) -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Revenues -0.196** -0.225** -0.242*** -0.254* -0.229* 
 (0.095) (0.086) (0.081) (0.136) (0.115) 
Expenditures -0.584*** -0.371*** -0.214** 0.254* 0.313*** 
 (0.106) (0.108) (0.087) (0.128) (0.102) 
Net capital 
outlays 
-0.046* -0.065*** -0.074*** -0.024 -0.243 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.035) (0.263) 
      
Observations 640 639 639 613 607 
R-squared 0.712 0.676 0.664 0.672 0.677 
Countries 27 27 27 30 30 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP growth. Explanatory variables are changes of fiscal variables (current revenues, 
current expenditures, net capital outlays, based on five strategies for identifying discretionary changes—PB, 
AFI, BFI, CAPB, and CAPBU), lagged GDP growth, lagged GDP growth in OECD countries, and lagged 
government debt (as a percentage of GDP). All regressions include cross-section and period-fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
 
GDP Growth in Periods of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 1) 
 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
GDP growth (-1) 0.336*** 0.459*** 0.239** 
 (0.092) (0.100) (0.094) 
GDP growth (-2) 0.006 -0.001 0.053 
 (0.070) (0.064) (0.070) 
OECD growth (-1) -0.019 -0.102 -0.010 
 (0.145) (0.128) (0.140) 
Debt (-1) -0.032*** -0.018*** -0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
PB -0.107  -0.076 
 (0.093)  (0.091) 
R  -0.345*  
  (0.176)  
E  -0.456***  
  (0.160)  
CO  0.165**  
  (0.083)  
-E/PB   1.468*** 
   (0.462) 
Constant 4.802*** 3.395*** 4.108*** 
 (0.600) (0.609) (0.618) 
    
 
Observations 
 
119 
 
115 
 
117 
R-squared 0.408 0.520 0.429 
    
 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP growth. Explanatory variables are changes of fiscal variables (primary balance, 
current revenues, current primary expenditures, and net capital outlays), lagged GDP growth, lagged world GDP 
growth, and lagged government debt (as a percentage of GDP). Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
 
GDP Growth in Periods of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 2) 
 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
GDP growth (-1) 0.489*** 0.483*** 0.468*** 
 (0.119) (0.116) (0.118) 
GDP growth (-2) -0.122 -0.042 -0.089 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) 
OECD growth (-1) -0.026 -0.031 -0.021 
 (0.136) (0.131) (0.135) 
Debt (-1) -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
PB -0.201***  -0.199*** 
 (0.074)  (0.073) 
R  -0.660***  
  (0.188)  
E  -0.124  
  (0.163)  
CO  0.213***  
  (0.074)  
-E/PB   0.862* 
   (0.450) 
Constant 4.189*** 4.111*** 3.845*** 
 (0.605) (0.611) (0.624) 
    
 
Observations 
 
109 
 
109 
 
109 
R-squared 0.416 0.475 0.436 
    
 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP growth. Explanatory variables are changes of fiscal variables (cyclically-
adjusted primary balance, cyclically-adjusted current revenues, and cyclically-adjusted current primary 
expenditures, based on the AFI), lagged GDP growth, lagged world GDP growth, and lagged government debt 
(as a percentage of GDP). Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6 
 
GDP Growth in Periods of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 3) 
 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
GDP growth (-1) 0.367*** 0.421*** 0.384*** 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) 
GDP growth (-2) -0.134* -0.068 -0.107 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) 
OECD growth (-1) 0.056 0.013 0.049 
 (0.130) (0.126) (0.129) 
Debt (-1) -0.020*** -0.015** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
PB -0.209***  -0.198** 
 (0.076)  (0.075) 
R  -0.508***  
  (0.183)  
E  -0.116  
  (0.159)  
CO  0.214***  
  (0.076)  
-E/PB   0.708 
   (0.440) 
Constant 3.907*** 3.399*** 3.416*** 
 (0.563) (0.605) (0.636) 
    
 
Observations 
 
103 
 
103 
 
103 
R-squared 0.311 0.368 0.329 
    
 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP growth. Explanatory variables are changes of fiscal variables (cyclically-
adjusted primary balance, cyclically-adjusted current revenues, and cyclically-adjusted current primary 
expenditures, based on the BFI), lagged GDP growth, lagged world GDP growth, and lagged government debt 
(as a percentage of GDP). S. E. in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
 
GDP Growth in Periods of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 4) 
 
  
 (1) (2) (4) 
 
    
GDP growth (-1) 0.778*** 0.823*** 0.818*** 
 (0.152) (0.154) (0.151) 
GDP growth (-2) -0.358*** -0.375*** -0.375*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) 
OECD growth (-1) -0.136 -0.188 -0.170 
 (0.201) (0.203) (0.199) 
Debt (-1) -0.018* -0.015 -0.018* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
CAPB -0.407***  -0.422*** 
 (0.120)  (0.118) 
CAR  -0.629**  
  (0.290)  
CAE  0.882***  
  (0.288)  
CO  0.389***  
  (0.121)  
-CAE/CAPB   -1.224* 
   (0.681) 
Constant 3.867*** 4.118*** 4.222*** 
 (0.910) (0.970) (0.918) 
    
 
Observations 
 
84 
 
83 
 
84 
R-squared 0.486 0.512 0.507 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP growth. Explanatory variables are changes of fiscal variables (cyclically-
adjusted primary balance, cyclically-adjusted current revenues, and cyclically-adjusted current primary 
expenditures, based on the OECD measure), lagged GDP growth, lagged world GDP growth, and lagged 
government debt (as a percentage of GDP). Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
 
GDP Growth in Periods of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 5) 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
    
GDP growth (-1) 1.007*** 1.044*** 1.008*** 
 (0.158) (0.156) (0.159) 
GDP growth (-2) -0.438*** -0.415*** -0.437*** 
 (0.143) (0.141) (0.144) 
OECD growth (-1) -0.324 -0.295 -0.334 
 (0.247) (0.244) (0.250) 
Debt (-1) -0.015 -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CAPBU -0.547*  -0.548* 
 (0.317)  (0.320) 
CARU  -0.714*  
  (0.371)  
CAEU  0.474  
  (0.326)  
CO  -1.303  
  (1.090)  
-CAEU/CAPBU   0.273 
   (0.631) 
Constant 3.567*** 2.960** 3.410** 
 (1.232) (1.254) (1.294) 
    
 
Observations 
 
58 
 
58 
 
58 
R-squared 0.623 0.650 0.624 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP growth. Explanatory variables are changes of fiscal variables (underlying 
primary balance, underlying current revenues, and underlying current primary expenditures, based on Definition 
5), lagged GDP growth, lagged world GDP growth, and lagged government debt (as a percentage of GDP). 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 
 
Episodes of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 1) 
 
Australia  1998, 2011 
Austria   1984, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2011 
Belgium  1982, 1984, 1987, 2006, 2010 
Canada   1981, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 
Czech Republic 1996, 2004, 2007, 2011 
Denmark  1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 2004, 2005 
Estonia   1997, 2000, 2010 
Finland   1984, 1988, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2011 
France   1996, 2011 
Germany  1996, 2000, 2006, 2007, 2011 
Greece   1996, 1998, 2005, 2010, 2011 
Hungary  1996, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 
Iceland   1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2012 
Ireland   2000, 2011, 2012 
Israel 
Italy   1982, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2007 
Japan   1984, 1999, 2004, 2006 
Korea   2000, 2004, 2010 
Luxemburg  1993, 1997, 2000, 2007 
Netherlands  1991, 1996 
New Zealand  1987, 1989, 1993, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2011, 2012 
Norway 1983, 1985, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2011 
Poland 2011 
Portugal  1982, 1983, 1988, 2006, 2011 
Slovenia  1996, 2012 
Spain   1986, 1987, 1996, 2010 
Sweden 1981, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2005 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 1982, 1988, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2010, 2011 
United States 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 93; own calculations. 
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Table A.2 
 
Episodes of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 2) 
 
Australia  2011 
Austria   1984, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2011 
Belgium  1982, 1984, 1987, 2006, 2010 
Canada   1981, 1986, 1987, 1995, 1996, 1997 
Czech Republic 1996, 1999, 2004 
Denmark  1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 2004, 2005 
Estonia    
Finland   1984, 1988, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000 
France   1996, 2011 
Germany  1996, 2000, 2011 
Greece   1996, 1998, 2005, 2010, 2011 
Hungary  1996, 1998, 2003, 2007, 2011 
Iceland   1984, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1997, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2012 
Ireland   2011, 2012 
Israel    
Italy   1982, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1997, 2006, 2007 
Japan   1984, 1999, 2001, 2006 
Korea   2000, 2004, 2010 
Luxemburg   
Netherlands  1985, 1991, 1996 
New Zealand  1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 2002, 2011, 2012 
Norway 1983, 1985, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2011 
Poland 1999, 2011 
Portugal  1982, 1983, 1995, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2011 
Slovenia  2012 
Spain   1983, 1987, 1992, 2010 
Sweden 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2004, 
2005 
Switzerland 2003 
United Kingdom 1982, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2010, 2011 
United States 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 93; own calculations. 
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Table A.3 
 
Episodes of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 3) 
 
Australia   
Austria   1984, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2011 
Belgium  1982, 1984, 1987, 2006, 2010 
Canada   1981, 1996, 1997 
Czech Republic 1996, 1999, 2004 
Denmark  1983, 1984, 1986, 2004, 2005, 2010 
Estonia    
Finland   1981, 1984, 1988, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 
France   1996, 2011 
Germany  1996, 2000, 2011 
Greece   1996, 2005, 2010 
Hungary  1996, 1998, 2003, 2007, 2011 
Iceland   1984, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1997, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2012 
Ireland   2011, 2012 
Israel    
Italy   1982, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1997, 2000, 2006, 2007 
Japan   1984, 1999, 2001, 2006 
Korea   2000, 2004, 2010 
Luxemburg   
Netherlands  1983, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2004 
New Zealand  1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 2002, 2011, 2012 
Norway 1983, 1989, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011 
Poland 2011 
Portugal  1982, 1983, 1988, 1995, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2011 
Slovenia  2002, 2012 
Spain   1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 2010 
Sweden 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2004, 2005 
Switzerland 2003 
United Kingdom 1981, 1982, 2000, 2010, 2011 
United States 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 93; own calculations. 
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Table A.4 
 
Episodes of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 4) 
 
Australia  2011 
Austria   1996, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2011 
Belgium  1993, 2006 
Canada   1986, 1987, 1995, 1996, 1997 
Czech Republic 1999, 2004 
Denmark  2004, 2005 
Estonia   2009 
Finland   1988, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 
France   1996, 2011 
Germany  1996, 2000, 2011 
Greece   1996, 1998, 2005, 2010, 2011 
Hungary  1999, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 
Iceland   1984, 1990, 1992, 1995, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
Ireland   2011, 2012 
Israel 
Italy   1991, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2012 
Japan   1999, 2006 
Korea    2000, 2004, 2010 
Luxemburg  1997 
Netherlands  1991, 1993, 1996, 2004, 2010 
New Zealand  1987, 1989, 1993, 1994, 2000, 2011 
Norway 1983, 1994, 1995 
Poland    2011, 2012 
Portugal  1992, 2002, 2006, 2011 
Slovenia  2012 
Spain   1992, 1996, 2010 
Sweden  1994, 1996, 1997, 2000 
Switzerland   
United Kingdom 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2010, 2011 
United States    
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 93; own calculations. 
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Table A.5 
 
Episodes of Fiscal Adjustments (Definition 5) 
 
Australia  2011 
Austria   1996, 1997, 2001 
Belgium  1993 
Canada   1995, 1996, 1997 
Czech Republic 2004, 2012 
Denmark  2005 
Estonia   2009 
Finland   1988, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 
France   2011 
Germany   
Greece   2010, 2011, 2012 
Hungary  2007, 2012 
Iceland   1984, 1995, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012 
Ireland   2010, 2011, 2012 
Israel   2004 
Italy   1993, 1995, 2012 
Japan 
Korea   2000 
Luxemburg  1997 
Netherlands  1991, 1993 
New Zealand  1993, 1994, 2000 
Norway 1983, 1994, 1995, 2000 
Poland 2011, 2012 
Portugal  1992, 2006, 2011 
Slovenia  2012 
Spain   1992, 1996, 2010, 2012 
Sweden  1996, 1997, 2005 
Switzerland  2000 
United Kingdom 1997, 1998, 2011 
United States    
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 93; own calculations. 
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Table A.6 
 
Estimated Elasticities, Equation (5) 
 
Country Transfers Current Revenues Current Expenditures 
    
Australia 0.325 -0.323 0.741 
Austria 0.458 0.232 0.877 
Belgium 0.346 0.553 0.729 
Canada 0.675 0.324 1.461 
Czech Republic 0.165 -0.004 0.431 
Denmark 0.522 -0.198 1.053 
Estonia 0.306 - 0.704 
Finland 0.748 0.533 1.054 
France 0.314 0.390 0.628 
Germany 0.488 -0.256 0.185 
Greece 0.149 0.275 0.423 
Hungary 0.253 0.432 0.232 
Iceland 0.514 -1.197 0.215 
Ireland 0.554 0.247 0.830 
Israel 0.099 - - 
Italy 0.171 0.839 0.054 
Japan 0.430 -1.191 1.388 
Korea 0.102 0.405 0.467 
Luxembourg 0.736 -0.288 - 
Netherlands 0.632 0.578 0.941 
New Zealand 0.608 -0.468 0.575 
Norway 1.219 0.062 2.509 
Poland 0.101 -0.162 0.044 
Portugal 0.320 -0.295 0.160 
Slovenia 0.667 0.524 1.329 
Spain 0.256 -0.139 0.416 
Sweden 0.404 0.109 0.822 
Switzerland 0.783 0.185 1.421 
United Kingdom 0.599 0.136 1.012 
United States 0.525 -0.563 1.043 
 
Note: The elasticities are computed using Equation (5), based on the suggestions by Blanchard (1990) and the 
method proposed by Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Supplementary Material 
 
 
In figure A.1, I use Germany as an example to illustrate the influence of one-off capital 
transfers on CAPB. It shows three indicators of fiscal policy over the period 1991 to 2012 for 
Germany. One series shows the (non-adjusted) general government primary balance (PB), the 
second is cyclically-adjusted (CAPB), and the third series shows the underlying primary 
balance (CAPBU) after excluding one-offs in capital transfers. Figure A.2 shows the annual 
changes in the three balances as shown in Figure A.1, as well as the Alesina measure (AFI) 
and the Blanchard measure (BFI).
24
 
According to Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Alesina and Ardagna (2011), a large change in 
fiscal policy is an annual change of more than 1.5 percentage points of GDP. Between 1991 
and 2007, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) identify four cases of large changes in fiscal policy in 
Germany. Based on their identification strategy, there have been two cases of fiscal stimuli 
(1995 and 2001) and two cases of fiscal adjustments (1996 and 2000). Other studies, however, 
do not identify 1996 and 2000 as periods of fiscal adjustments (e.g., Breuer et al., 2011). 
Figure 2 show that all four periods of changes in fiscal policy as identified by Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010) reflect one-off expenditures. As discussed by Leigh et al. (2010), the increase 
in the German general government budget balance in 1995 does not reflect discretionary fiscal 
policy, but one-off expenditures. The one-off in 1995 reflects an accounting operation in the 
aftermath of German Reunification (Guajardo et al., 2011). In 1995, the German general 
government incurred the financial liabilities of former East German state-owned companies 
(Treuhandanstalt). 
The change in 2000 involves one-off revenues from a UMTS license auction.
25
 The changes 
in 1996 and 2001 reflect that the effects of 1995 and 2000 disappeared in the budget of the 
next year. Figure A.2 shows that—without controlling for one-off expenditures in capital 
transfers—the change in the CAPS in all four periods is greater than 1.5 percentage points 
because of two outliers in capital expenditures. Only the expansion in 2001 appears to be a 
fiscal stimulus, after exclusion of one-offs, since Germany enacted an additional corporate tax 
reform in 2001. The estimated stimulus in this year decreases, however, to a large extent. This 
example shows that one-off operations influence the government budget through net capital 
transfers and thus undermine the accuracy of CAPS as a measure of discretionary change. 
                                                 
24
 Since AFI and BFI correct only for year-over-year changes, I only express these measures as changes in fiscal 
policy, but do not included them in Figure 1. 
25
 According to the German Federal Ministry of Finance (2000), the yield of 99.4 bn. DM (50.8 bn Euro) is 
posted as sales of nonfinancial assets, so that “general government will show a clear surplus in 2000.” 
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Figure S.1 
 
PB, CAPB, and CAPBU as a Share of (Potential) GDP, Germany 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database, No. 93. 
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Figure S.2 
 
Different Measures of Fiscal Policy, Germany 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database, No. 93; own calculations. 
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